Evicted from one factory, employees unpaid at others as Michael Reardon, “savior” of sailboat brands, faces mounting lawsuits

EDENTON, NC — In May 2025, Michael Reardon was hailed as a savior of American boatbuilding. The CEO of Daedalus Composites had just acquired iconic sailboat maker Catalina Yachts, with plans to create what he called “America’s largest recreational boatbuilding network.”

By October, Reardon had been evicted from the Catalina factory for not paying rent, workers at his facilities had gone weeks without paychecks, and court documents revealed he owed more than $1 million to the company he’d bought just months earlier.

The swift collapse left dozens of workers without jobs, customers without boats they’d paid for, and serious questions about what happened to the money.

May: The Acquisition

When Reardon purchased Catalina Yachts and True North powerboats in May, the boating press went into “full adoration mode,” as sailing journalist Peter Swanson later described it in Loose Cannon. Reardon was portrayed as an experienced builder with the vision and resources to revive struggling American brands.

The deal gave Reardon control of one of the most recognized names in affordable cruising sailboats. Catalina had introduced generations of Americans to sailing. The purchase included a lease on the company’s manufacturing facility in Largo, Florida, and called for Reardon to pay $1 million for the company’s assets—but that payment would be deferred.

The arrangement seemed reasonable: Reardon would pay rent on the facility while running the operation, and the $1 million would come due later. The previous owners, a California-based company run by the family of the late Frank Butler, would maintain an interest in ensuring the transition succeeded.

June: The First Warning Sign

According to a lawsuit later filed by California Catalina and reported by Swanson, Reardon made one rent payment on the Largo facility. Then he stopped.

This happened in June—just one month after taking over the operation. Whatever went wrong, it went wrong almost immediately.

The lawsuit, filed in September in Pinellas County, Florida, alleges that by falling behind on rent, Reardon defaulted on the “asset purchase agreement” with California Catalina, causing the $1 million deferred purchase price to come due immediately, according to court documents.

But in June and July, these problems weren’t yet public. To the outside world, Reardon was running Catalina Yachts. Workers showed up every day. Boats were being built.

August: Buying More While Not Paying Bills

Even as Reardon wasn’t paying rent in Florida, he was acquiring more companies.

In late August, Reardon purchased Tartan Yachts, Freedom Yachts, and AMP Carbon Spars. These weren’t small operations—Tartan, based in Painesville, Ohio, was another respected name in American sailboat manufacturing with its own loyal customer base.

The purchase terms were described as “a dollar down” plus a portion of proceeds from future sales. Essentially, Reardon was acquiring companies with almost no money upfront.

According to sources familiar with the Tartan factory cited by Swanson, workers there were immediately furloughed after the acquisition. They would later return to work, though questions remain about the current status of operations.

Also in August, Swanson reported that Reardon raised $124,000 by selling accounts receivable—unpaid customer invoices—to two New York factoring houses at a discount. Factoring is a method businesses use to raise quick cash when they need it urgently. Those factoring companies are now suing him for non-payment.

Meanwhile, at the Florida Catalina facility, workers were experiencing problems with their paychecks. According to statements on social media and later confirmed in court filings reported by Loose Cannon, employees began receiving late payments or no payments at all.

The operation also went “out of trust” with suppliers—boat industry terminology meaning the company had been cut off from credit and could no longer purchase materials or equipment without paying cash upfront. Parts department employees reportedly began sourcing components from Amazon in an effort to keep boat construction moving, according to Sailing Scuttlebutt.

September: The Lawsuit

On September 18, California Catalina filed its lawsuit, as reported by Swanson. The complaint outlined the rent default and demanded $113,000 in back rent. More significantly, it invoked the clause making the $1 million purchase price immediately due.

The lawsuit also listed collateral: 11 boats at various stages of construction in the Largo facility. Nine of those boats were in active production, some near completion.

This was significant. Catalina’s business model involved taking a substantial down payment from customers, then collecting the balance at delivery. A boat like the Catalina 446 sells for more than $600,000. Nine boats in various stages of completion could represent $2 million to $5 million in customer deposits and final payments.

If that money existed when Reardon took over—or if he’d been collecting deposits from new customers—where did it go? Why couldn’t he pay rent or meet payroll?

By the time the lawsuit was filed, workers at the Florida facility had been going without paychecks for weeks. But they had not been officially laid off, which would have allowed them to collect unemployment benefits, according to worker statements on social media cited by Sailing Scuttlebutt.

October 14: “The Investor”

On October 14, Catalina President Patrick Turner called a meeting with employees. A video of his remarks was obtained news sources and posted online.

Turner explained that Reardon had been in discussions with a potential investor who could provide the capital infusion the company needed to continue. But the investor, Turner said, “keeps asking more questions” and ultimately wouldn’t commit.

“Michael, our owner, has done his part in getting someone involved, the investor,” Turner told the couple dozen workers gathered. “The investor was asking questions, and we’d keep answering, and he keeps asking more questions.”

Turner announced that everyone was being laid off.

The investor explanation seemed to position the closure as unfortunate timing—just one more question away from being saved. But the timeline told a different story. Reardon had stopped paying rent in June, four months earlier. The lawsuit had been filed in September. Workers had been unpaid for five weeks.

If there had been a serious investor interested in August or September, why was the company already in such dire financial straits?

October: The Eviction

A Pinellas County court granted California Catalina’s request to evict Reardon from the factory. Because Reardon did not respond to the lawsuit, the court entered a default judgment against him.

The eviction was carried out. A notice was taped to the factory door, with a photo later entered into evidence in the lawsuit.

The court is still weighing California Catalina’s larger claim: the $1 million purchase price, plus interest, attorney fees, and monetary damages, according to Sailing Scuttlebutt.

Inside the now-closed factory sit nine boats in various stages of construction. Some are nearly complete. Customers have paid substantial deposits for these vessels. Workers who built them — many earning just $16 an hour, according to Swanson — were never fully paid for their labor. Suppliers provided materials on credit that will likely never be repaid.

The Other Facilities

Shortly after announcing the Catalina closure, Patrick Turner’s LinkedIn page began listing him as president of Tartan Yachts in Ohio.

This raised immediate concerns. Turner had been president of Florida Catalina when it collapsed. He’d delivered the news about the failed investor and the layoffs. Now he was leading another Reardon-owned operation.

Workers at Tartan had been furloughed immediately after Reardon’s August acquisition. They reportedly returned to work, but questions remain: Are they being paid regularly? Is actual production happening? Are suppliers being paid?

The status of Freedom Yachts and AMP Spars — the other brands Reardon acquired in August — remains unclear.

Edenton: The Unfinished Dream

And then there’s Edenton, North Carolina, where this story began.

Reardon’s Daedalus Composites operation was supposed to be different. High-tech. Revolutionary. Building advanced carbon-fiber catamarans using aerospace-quality materials and methods.

The state of North Carolina believed in the vision enough to award Reardon two grants totaling $1 million, according to announcements from the North Carolina Department of Commerce:

• 2019: $500,000 to renovate a 38,000-square-foot building for Daedalus Composites, with Reardon promising to create 50 jobs and invest $1.1 million in private funds.

• 2022: Another $500,000 for Reardon’s subsidiary, Hermes Marine, LLC, to manufacture 32-foot powerboats, with promises to create 136 jobs and invest $880,000.

Governor Roy Cooper announced the 2022 grant as part of efforts to build “a strong, resilient economy” in rural North Carolina, according to the state announcement. Chowan County, where Edenton is located, is one of the state’s economically distressed areas—exactly the kind of place these grants are designed to help.

According to David Rhoades, NC Department of Commerce Director of Communications, no state money was ever paid for the grant because the Daedalus projects did not proceed.

“The way our rural grants work is, at the time of award announcement, a dollar figure of support is announced, but never paid upfront,” he said in an email. “Once a project gets underway and work has been completed, receipts are submitted to us and we reimburse for those actual expenses. So, as this project did not proceed, no request for reimbursements were ever made.”

In 2019, it was announced that Reardon partnered with the College of The Albemarle to train workers in advanced composite materials, according to Business North Carolina. It looked like a serious, long-term commitment to the community.

In October 2025, the Edenton facility went up for sale. The asking price: $3.5 million for the 38,400-square-foot building with its crane rails, 30-foot ceilings, and waterfront access, according to a Colliers real estate listing.

Real estate photos show an enormous catamaran inside, unfinished. According to industry observers, Daedalus apparently never sold a boat. The vessel in the photos may be the only one the company ever attempted to build.

Employees have been let go, according to sources close to the region’s workforce development agencies. The building sits empty.

The Victims

The collapse of Reardon’s boat-building network has left damage across multiple states:

Workers in Florida went weeks without paychecks before being laid off, according to Swanson. Many earned modest wages—as little as $16 an hour—and now face uncertainty about back pay they’re owed. Because they weren’t officially laid off until Turner’s October 14 announcement, they couldn’t collect unemployment during the weeks they worked without pay.

Workers in Ohio were furloughed immediately after Reardon acquired Tartan. Their current status remains unclear.

Workers in North Carolina lost jobs at what was supposed to be a growing advanced-manufacturing operation backed by state investment in their community.

Customers who paid deposits on boats—in some cases six-figure deposits on expensive sailing yachts—now face an uncertain future. Their boats sit unfinished in a facility Reardon no longer controls. One customer was mentioned by name in online discussions: Sail Annapolis, apparently waiting for a boat that may never be delivered.

The legal questions around these boats are complex: Do the boats belong to California Catalina as collateral in the lawsuit? Do they belong to the customers who contracted and paid deposits for them? Can they be completed and delivered?

Suppliers who provided materials on credit to these operations face losses. Some provided components for boats that will never be finished, meaning they’ll never be paid.

Communities that welcomed these operations — Edenton, Largo, and Painesville —expected sustained employment and economic activity. Edenton and Chowan County invested public goodwill and state grant funds based on job-creation promises.

The industry itself has lost production capacity, at least temporarily. Catalina was one of the most recognized names in affordable cruising sailboats, introducing generations to sailing. Tartan and Freedom had devoted followings. Their absence leaves gaps in the market and raises questions about the viability of American recreational boatbuilding.

The Money Question

Throughout this story, one question persists: Where did the money go?

Customer deposits on nine partially completed boats could represent millions of dollars. The asset purchase agreement presumably included existing accounts receivable and work-in-progress inventory. Reardon raised $124,000 from factoring houses in August, according to Sailing Scuttlebutt.

Yet by September, he owed just $113,000 in back rent—a relatively small sum compared to the potential revenue from even one completed boat. Workers making $16 an hour weren’t being paid. Suppliers were demanding cash.

The math doesn’t add up. If Reardon had access to customer deposit money, why couldn’t he meet basic obligations like rent and payroll? If he didn’t have access to that money, what was his plan for running the business?

The asset purchase agreement and financial records would answer these questions, but those documents aren’t public. Reardon hasn’t responded to the lawsuit or to requests for comment. The full picture of what happened to the money remains unknown.

What Comes Next?

The Florida court will eventually rule on California Catalina’s claim for the full $1 million plus damages and attorney fees. That will establish how much Reardon owes, though whether he has assets to pay remains unclear.

The factoring houses will pursue their lawsuits in New York, according to industry sources.

Customers may file their own legal claims over unfinished boats and unrecoverable deposits.

But for workers who went weeks without paychecks, customers who paid deposits on boats they’ll likely never receive, and communities that believed in promises of economic revival, the immediate questions are simpler: How did this happen? And could anyone have seen it coming?

In Part 2, we’ll examine Reardon’s history of ambitious promises, the warning signs that may have been missed, and the accountability questions facing state officials who awarded public funds to his operations.